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“NO MAN IS ABOVE THE LAW AND NO MAN IS BELOW 
IT”: HOW QUALIFIED IMMUNITY REFORM COULD CREATE 
ACCOUNTABILITY AND CURB WIDESPREAD POLICE 
MISCONDUCT 
Lindsey de Stefan* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In recent months, it has been difficult to ignore the overwhelming 
presence of police violence in the media.1  Hardly a month has gone 
by without headlines asserting use of excessive force, brutality, or other 
misconduct in some corner of the United States.2  It seems that no 
region of the nation has been unaffected by the violence, with civilian 
deaths at the hands of law enforcement cropping up from San 
Francisco3 to New York City4 to South Carolina,5 and almost everywhere 
in between.  And with public confidence in law enforcement at a 
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     1 Commentary and criticism about American police has spanned various forms of 
media and traversed many genres.  See, e.g., The Daily Show with Jon Stewart (Comedy 
Central television broadcast Dec. 3, 2014) (discussing the grand jury’s decision not to 
indict the officer who killed Eric Gardner, explaining:  “I think what is so utterly 
depressing is that none of the ambiguities that existed in the Ferguson case exist in 
the Staten Island Case, and yet the outcome is exactly the same: No crime, no trial.  All 
harm, no foul.”). 
 2  See, e.g., Unarmed Black Mo. Teen Shot After Altercation, Police Say, CBS NEWS (Aug. 
10, 2014, 1:30 PM), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/michael-brown-shooting-
unarmed-black-missouri-teen-shot-after-altercation-police-say/; Josh Sanburn, Behind 
the Video of Eric Garner’s Deadly Confrontation with New York Police, TIME (July 23, 2014), 
http://time.com/3016326/eric-garner-video-police-chokehold-death/. 
 3  See Timothy Williams, San Francisco Police Officers to Be Dismissed over Racist Texts, 
N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 3, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/04/us/san-francisco-
police-officers-to-be-dismissed-over-racist-texts.html?_r=0. 
 4  See Christopher Mathias, Video Shows NYPD Officers Beating Brooklyn Man After He 
Appears to Surrender, HUFFINGTON POST (July 23, 2015, 1:11 PM), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/nypd-beating-thomas-
jennings_55b0ff8fe4b07af29d57a1c0. 
 5  See Michael S. Schmidt & Matt Apuzzo, South Carolina Officer Is Charged with 
Murder of Walter Scott, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 7, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/ 
08/us/south-carolina-officer-is-charged-with-murder-in-black-mans-death.html?_r=0. 
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twenty-two year low—with only fifty-two percent of United States 
citizens asserting that they have considerable confidence in law 
enforcement6—the nation has clearly taken notice.7 
Naturally, these violent incidents raise important questions for 
many Americans, regardless of locale or the type of community in 
which they reside.  Why is this happening?  And how can we stop it?  
Unsurprisingly, extensive media commentary has invited a myriad of 
proposed answers to these inquiries and has even generated some 
potential solutions.  Some point to a lack of education and opine that 
officers need more comprehensive training to teach them how to 
“defuse the sorts of deadly, racially charged confrontations” that have 
recently been highlighted in numerous communities throughout the 
country.8  Others suggest that allowing citizens to record police would 
create officer accountability, serve as a disciplinary basis for abusive 
behavior, encourage the use of justified policing tactics, and generally 
deter misconduct.9  Others still suggest that police culture is to blame 
since rookies shape their attitudes about the use of force based on the 
words and actions of fellow officers,10 and because the warrior 
mentality of policing fosters an “us” versus “them” relationship 
between law enforcement and citizens.11  In fact, a few experts have 
even suggested that there has not been a wave of police violence, but 
that mainstream media is merely covering brutality more frequently 
 
 6  See Jeffrey M. Jones, In U.S., Confidence in Police Lowest in 22 Years, GALLUP (June 
19, 2015), http://www.gallup.com/poll/183704/confidence-police-lowest-years.aspx 
(explaining that 25% of Americans have a “great deal of confidence” in police, 30% 
have “some confidence,” 27% have “quite a lot” of confidence, and an all-time high of 
18% have either “very little or no confidence in police”).  
 7  The international community has also reacted to U.S. police brutality.  See, e.g., 
Adam Taylor, How the Rest of the World Reacted to the Ferguson Verdict, WASH. POST (Nov. 
25, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2014/11/25/ 
how-the-rest-of-the-world-reacted-to-the-ferguson-verdict/ (“‘So the U.S. government, 
when talking about their own country, forgets about democracy, human rights, 
protection of “peaceful protesters” and people’s right to protest,’ Russian news outlet 
Pravda.ru proclaimed . . . .”). 
 8  Phillip Swarts, Police Need Better Training and Community Relations, Presidential 
Task Force is Told, WASH. TIMES (Jan. 13, 2015), http://www.washingtontimes.com/ 
news/2015/jan/13/police-brutality-solutions-are-training-community-/?page=all. 
 9  See Carol M. Bast, Tipping the Scales in Favor of Civilian Taping of Encounters with 
Police Officers, 5 U. DENV. CRIM. L. REV. 61, 97 (2015). 
 10  See David Lester, Officer Attitudes Toward Police Use of Force, in AND JUSTICE FOR 
ALL: UNDERSTANDING AND CONTROLLING POLICE ABUSE OF FORCE 177, 182–83 (William 
A. Geller & Hans Toch eds., 1995). 
 11  Sue Rahr & Stephen K. Rice, From Warriors to Guardians: Recommitting American 
Police Culture to Democratic Ideals, NAT’L INST. OF JUST., https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/ 
nij/248654.pdf (last visited Jan. 2, 2017). 
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and comprehensively.12 
Irrespective of whether there has been an increase in the 
incidence of brutality or whether the nation is merely recognizing what 
has been an ongoing reality for many United States citizens, the 
existence of a problem is now inescapably obvious.  The solution, 
however, is decidedly less clear.  Perhaps none of the aforementioned 
proposals are the right answer.  Alternatively, and more likely, maybe 
they are all the answer—at least partially and in combination with a 
number of other considerations.  It is improbable that a single factor 
can be deemed the sole cause of widespread police misconduct.  Of 
course, an elaborate problem with multiple dimensions will require an 
equally multifaceted solution.  In fact, any adequate resolution will 
likely require the cooperation of many individuals and entities across 
various disciplines and industries.13  But no matter how winding, every 
path to change must begin with a single step.  And the most logical 
place to begin is by reforming the stringent protection from civil 
liability enjoyed by law enforcement officers alleged to have violated 
individual constitutional rights. 
This Comment will explore how judicial amendment of the 
qualified immunity doctrine—specifically as it is applied to law 
enforcement officers—could serve as a catalyst to begin to rein in 
police misconduct.  Part II will describe the general history of the most 
significant statutory provision in this context, § 1983, and the 
expansion of constitutional torts that occurred in the mid-twentieth 
century.  Part III focuses on the judicial development of qualified 
immunity in the Supreme Court and explains the status of the doctrine 
today.  Part IV discusses some of the most significant practical 
problems with the modern qualified immunity jurisprudence and its 
application.  Part V goes on to analyze the recent spotlight on police 
use of force.  Finally, Part VI proposes that judicial amendment of 
qualified immunity application will serve as an effective first step in 
decreasing the overall incidence of police misconduct in the United 
States. 
 
 12  See Eliott C. McLaughlin, We’re Not Seeing More Police Shootings, Just More News 
Coverage, CNN (Apr. 21, 2015, 7:26 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2015/04/20/us/ 
police-brutality-video-social-media-attitudes/ (discussing the lack of accurate statistics 
regarding police killing civilians in the line of duty or police use of excessive force). 
 13  For example, implementing more comprehensive training would take the 
combined efforts of experts in police brutality to design such training, as well as the 
cooperation of police forces nationwide.  Statutes protecting those who audiotape 
police would require congressional or state legislative action—or both.  And a change 
in police culture would necessitate the active participation of police unions and local 
law enforcement nationwide. 
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II. THE COURT’S EXPANSION OF REMEDIES FOR VIOLATIONS OF 
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS 
To appreciate the qualified immunity doctrine and its modern 
implications, one must first journey briefly down the historical path 
that preceded its inception.  That path begins with § 1983 of Title 42 
of the United States Code, which provides: 
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, 
regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the 
District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any 
citizen of the United States or other person within the 
jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, 
privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and 
laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, 
suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress, except 
that in any action brought against a judicial officer for an act 
or omission taken in such officer’s judicial capacity, 
injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a declaratory 
decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable.14 
Although the statute now finds its home in the United States 
Code, it was originally enacted as part of the Civil Rights Act of 1871 
and was colloquially referred to as the “Ku Klux Klan Act” at that time.15  
In the post-Civil War Reconstruction years, the so-called Radical 
Republicans in Congress were becoming increasingly worried that 
murders, whippings, and other (mostly) Klan-perpetrated brutalities 
in some southern states were preventing newly freed slaves from 
voting.16  These fears were affirmed when the 1870 elections brought a 
wave of violence.17  After most affected state governments failed both 
to punish the perpetrators of those atrocities and to protect the 
victims, Congress intervened by passing the Civil Rights Act of 1871, 
which included what we now know as § 1983.18  In the subsequent 
ninety years, § 1983 was largely inconsequential;19 but in 1961, when 
 
 14  42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012). 
 15  Ian D. Forsythe, A Guide to Civil Rights Liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983: An 
Overview of Supreme Court and Eleventh Circuit Precedent, THE CONST. SOC’Y, 
http://www.constitution.org/brief/forsythe_42-1983.htm (last visited Jan. 2, 2017). 
 16  David Achtenberg, A “Milder Measure of Villainy”: The Unknown History of 42 
U.S.C. § 1983 and the Meaning of “Under Color of” Law, 1999 UTAH L. REV. 1, 7 (1999). 
 17  Id. 
 18  Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 174–76 (1961), overruled in part by 436 U.S. 658 
(1978). 
 19  See Harry A. Blackmun, Section 1983 and Federal Protection of Individual Rights—
Will the Statute Remain Alive or Fade Away?, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 8–12 (1985) (explaining 
“as the 20th century dawned, the Nation’s commitment to civil rights lay in remnants” 
as a result of the Supreme Court’s narrow interpretations of the Civil Rights Acts, gains 
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the United States Supreme Court handed down its decision in Monroe 
v. Pape, the statute began a rapid ascent to a position of significance in 
constitutional and civil rights jurisprudence.20 
In Monroe, the Court held that § 1983 provided a remedy to 
individuals “deprived of constitutional rights, privileges, and 
immunities” as a result of a government official’s abuse of his 
position.21  In reaching this conclusion, the Court relied on its earlier 
statutory construction of the phrase “under color of” as including acts 
of an official that are in violation of state law.22  The Court also reviewed 
the legislative history of the original Civil Rights Act in considerable 
detail and determined that one of Congress’s primary purposes was to 
provide a federal remedy for infringements of constitutional rights in 
circumstances in which a state remedy was theoretically, but not 
practically, available.23  In so concluding, the Court vastly expanded the 
understanding of—and, thus, the potential application of—§ 1983 as 
a tool in civil rights litigation.24  Indeed, after Monroe, the number of 
cases brought under the statute skyrocketed,25 and § 1983 has since 
 
made by Democrats in Congress, and the move toward reconciliation); Eric H. 
Zagrans, “Under Color of” What Law: A Reconstructed Model of Section 1983 Liability, 71 VA. 
L. REV. 499, 499–500 n.2 (1985) (explaining that § 1983 “languished in obscurity” until 
1961, with only twenty-one cases brought under § 1983 in federal courts between 1871 
and 1920—only nine of which made it to the Supreme Court). 
 20  See Forsythe, supra note 15. 
 21  365 U.S. at 172. 
 22  See Williams v. United States, 341 U.S. 97, 99 (1951); Screws v. United States, 
325 U.S. 91, 111 (1944) (“It is clear that under ‘color’ of law means under ‘pretense’ 
of law.”); United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 326 (1941) (“Misuse of power, 
possessed by virtue of state law and made possible only because the wrongdoer is 
clothed with the authority of state law, is action taken ‘under color of’ state law.”).  
 23  Monroe, 365 U.S. at 174–75 (describing the “lawless conditions” of the South and 
the failure of those states to provide any “effective redress”). 
 24  See Blackmun, supra note 19, at 19 (explaining that in the twenty-two years 
before Monroe, the number of § 1983 claims to reach the Court “can almost be counted 
on one hand”); David Rudovsky, The Qualified Immunity Doctrine in the Supreme Court: 
Judicial Activism and the Restriction of Constitutional Rights, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 23, 28 
(1989) (opining that “the Court freed the [Civil Rights] Act from a narrow and 
unjustified construction”); Michael Wells, The Past and the Future of Constitutional Torts: 
From Statutory Interpretation to Common Law Rules, 19 CONN. L. REV. 53, 53 (1986) 
(asserting that “the Supreme Court revived a long-neglected, ninety-year-old 
statute . . . making it the vehicle for a broad cause of action to remedy constitutional 
violations”); Zagrans, supra note 19, at 500–01 (averring that the Court “breathed new 
life into the moribund [Civil Rights Act]”). 
 25  See Ruggero J. Aldisert, Judicial Expansion of Federal Jurisdiction: A Federal Judge’s 
Thoughts on Section 1983, Comity and the Federal Caseload, 1973 LAW & SOC. ORDER 557, 
563 (1973) (describing the 1100% increase in cases brought under § 1983 in the 
decade after Monroe); History of the Federal Judiciary, FED. JUD. CTR., 
http://www.fjc.gov/history/home.nsf/page/jurisdiction_federal_question.html (last 
visited Oct. 26, 2016) (“Civil rights cases, particularly suits filed under Section 1983, 
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become the so-called “statute of choice” under which to bring 
constitutional tort lawsuits against government officials.26  But Monroe 
was not the Court’s last word on available redress for constitutional 
violations—rather, it was just the beginning of a long and tumultuous 
relationship. 
A decade later, the Court created a new cause of action that is, in 
effect, the federal analog of a § 1983 claim—the Bivens action.27  In 
Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, the 
Court concluded that there is a private right of action for violations of 
federal rights perpetrated by federal (rather than state) officials.28  
While Bivens did not directly implicate § 1983 or litigation 
thereunder,29 Bivens did further expand the availability of private 
remedies for constitutional torts.  Then, seventeen years after Monroe, 
the Court expanded the ambit of § 1983 even further.30  After 
undertaking a second (and equally exhaustive) review of the legislative 
history of the Civil Rights Act of 1871 in Monell v. Department of Social 
Services, the Court overruled a portion of its Monroe holding by 
concluding that municipal bodies could be subject to liability under § 
1983.31  However, the Court provided a substantial shield to municipal 
bodies by holding that a municipality could incur civil liability only 
when it was itself the cause of the constitutional violation alleged, rather 
than imposing liability vicariously based solely on its employment of 
the tortfeasor.32  Put differently, the Monell Court concluded that a 
municipal body might be subject to liability when “the action that is 
alleged to be unconstitutional implements or executes a policy 
statement, ordinance, regulation, or decision officially adopted and 
promulgated by that body’s officers.”33  But the Court left the door for 
 
became one of the largest sources of federal court business in the late twentieth 
century.”).  
 26  Rudovsky, supra note 24, at 25. 
 27  See John C. Jeffries, Jr., What’s Wrong With Qualified Immunity?, 62 FLA. L. REV. 
851, 851 (2010). 
 28  Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 
390, 392 (1971). 
 29  By its very language, § 1983 does not apply to constitutional rights violations by 
federal officials. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (emphasis added) (specifying its application to 
“[e]very person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or 
usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia . . . .”). 
 30  See Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 663 (1978). 
 31  See id. at 690. 
 32  See id. at 694 (emphasis added) (“[I]t is when execution of a government’s 
policy or custom, whether made by its lawmakers or by those whose edicts or acts may 
fairly be said to represent official policy, inflicts the injury that the government as an 
entity is responsible under § 1983.”). 
 33  Id. at 690. 
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any further municipal exemptions from liability wide open: “[W]e 
express no views on the scope of any municipal immunity beyond 
holding that municipal bodies sued under § 1983 cannot be entitled 
to an absolute immunity, lest our decision that such bodies are subject 
to suit under § 1983 ‘be drained of meaning.’”34 
Noticeably, none of these early cases directly grappled with the 
qualified immunity doctrine,35 and one might naturally wonder how 
they amount to significant steps on the path to its conception.  Indeed, 
the aggregate effect of these decisions appears to be a pivotal 
expansion in the development of constitutional rights by allowing 
individuals greater opportunity to seek redress when government 
officials violate their constitutional or statutory rights.  However, in the 
wake of these cases, the Court began to face the practical 
considerations of increased liability for government officials: its 
disallowance of vicarious municipal liability meant that, in most cases, 
the only potential defendant—and thus the only party who might 
shoulder the burden of damages to the plaintiff—would be the official 
who had inflicted the constitutional injury.36 
III. THE DEVELOPMENT OF QUALIFIED IMMUNITY 
The qualified immunity doctrine has diverged substantially from 
the general course toward expanding constitutional rights that Monroe 
and its progeny began to pave in the 1960s and 1970s.  It has instead 
veered off down a long and winding byway that continues until this day.  
In fact, it would sometimes seem that the two paths now travel in 
opposite directions altogether.  Notably, the statutory text of § 1983 
does not explicitly or impliedly provide for any immunities;37 but as the 
Court gradually increased liability for public officials who had violated 
constitutional rights, it correspondingly started to extend the 
immunities that had traditionally been available at common law.38  
Interestingly, the Court conceded that the statute’s text is broader than 
the common law of torts was in 1871 because it “purports to create a 
 
 34  Id. at 701 (quoting Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 248 (1974)).  
 35  Save, of course, for Monell’s express declination to decide questions of 
immunity. 
 36  See Jon O. Newman, Suing the Lawbreakers: Proposals to Strengthen the Section 1983 
Damage Remedy for Law Enforcers’ Misconduct, 87 YALE L.J. 447, 455–56 (1978). 
 37  See supra text accompanying note 14. 
 38  See Kalina v. Fletcher, 522 U.S. 118, 123 (1997) (“We have . . . recognized that 
Congress intended [§ 1983] to be construed in light of common law principles that 
were well settled at the time of its enactment.”); Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 557 
(1967) (expanding the common law good faith and probable cause defense that was 
available for false arrest and imprisonment to actions brought under § 1983). 
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damages remedy against every state official for the violation of any 
person’s federal constitutional or statutory rights.”39  In order to deal 
with the lack of legal and historical context to fit the field of 
constitutional torts, the Court has come to rely on loosely related 
common law causes of action and their corresponding immunities40 in 
an attempt to tailor them to the structure of modern government.41  In 
so doing, the Court has gradually but consistently expanded the scope 
of immunities available, both in terms of which officials are entitled to 
such immunity42 and in regard to the types of situations in which 
immunity is available.43  The Court has arguably enlarged the 
immunities available to the officials perpetrating constitutional 
violations more than it expanded the remedies for those whose rights 
were violated in the first instance.44 
Interestingly, the Court began sketching the contours of official 
immunity under § 1983 a decade before it broadened the applicability 
 
 39  Kalina, 522 U.S. at 123. 
 40  See Wyatt v. Cole, 504 U.S. 158, 164 (1992) (explaining that “[i]n determining 
whether there was an immunity at common law that Congress intended to incorporate 
into the Civil Rights Act, we look to the most closely analogous torts”); Rudovsky, supra 
note 24, at 36 (explaining that a threshold question of the qualified immunity analysis 
is “whether and to what degree qualified immunity would have been a defense in 
common law analogues to constitutional tort claims”). 
 41  See Jack M. Beermann, Qualified Immunity and Constitutional Avoidance, 2009 SUP. 
CT. REV. 139, 145 (2009) (noting the Court-created doctrine used to adapt the scope 
of immunities at common law to contemporary government structure). 
 42  See, e.g., Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 807–13 (1982) (qualified immunity 
for high-level Presidential aides); Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 319 (1975) 
(qualified immunity for school officials); Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 237–38 
(1974) (qualified immunity for Governor of Ohio). 
 43  See generally City & Cty. of San Francisco v. Sheehan, 135 S. Ct. 1765, 1774–78 
(2015) (reversing Court of Appeals and granting qualified immunity to officers who 
forcibly entered a mentally disabled woman’s room and shot her multiple times); 
Carroll v. Carman, 135 S. Ct. 348, 349–50 (2014) (per curiam) (reversing Court of 
Appeals and granting qualified immunity to officer who went into a private backyard 
and onto the deck without a warrant); Plumhoff v. Rickard, 134 S. Ct. 2012, 2020–24 
(2014) (reversing District Court and Court of Appeals and granting qualified 
immunity to officers who fired fifteen shots to end a high-speed car chase and killed 
the driver and passenger); Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 374–86 (2007) (reversing 
District Court and Court of Appeals and granting qualified immunity to officer who 
ended a car chase by running the driver off the road and rendering him a 
quadriplegic). 
 44  See, e.g., Beermann, supra note 41, at 148–49 (explaining that eliminating the 
subjective prong of the qualified immunity analysis “dramatically expanded the 
immunity defense and made it more likely that defendants would prevail before trial”); 
Evan J. Mandery, Qualified Immunity or Absolute Impunity? The Moral Hazards of Extending 
Qualified Immunity to Lower-Level Public Officials, 17 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 479, 513 
(1994) (averring that the combination of qualified immunity and the protection for 
individual judgment built into many constitutional standards “offer[s] virtually 
absolute immunity to public officials”).   
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of that statute in Monroe, concluding “that § 1983 [was] to be read in 
harmony with general principles of tort immunities and defenses 
rather than in derogation of them.”45  Accordingly, in Tenney v. 
Brandhove the Court noted a legacy of legislative freedom dating back 
to sixteenth century England and held that legislators were entitled to 
absolute immunity from civil liability when acting within their 
legislative capacity.46  The Court later reinforced a similarly 
longstanding tradition of absolute judicial immunity47 and the well-
settled common law rule of absolute immunity for prosecutors.48 
Even before its admittedly limited imposition of municipal 
liability in Monell, the Court had already begun to rein in the breadth 
of the newly expanded § 1983 remedy.49  In Pierson v. Ray, the Court 
faced the issue of what immunity, if any, was available to police officers 
who arrested a group of clergymen for violating a Mississippi law when, 
several years after the arrest, the law was held unconstitutional as 
applied to circumstances similar to those at issue.50  In holding that 
officers were immune from civil liability if they acted in good faith and 
with probable cause, the Court placed a particular emphasis on 
fairness, reasoning that a police officer should not have to “choose 
between being charged with dereliction of duty if he does not arrest 
when he has probable cause, and being mulcted in damages if he 
does.”51  In recognizing that public officials not otherwise entitled to 
absolute immunity52 also require some margin for error,53 Pierson’s 
“good faith and probable cause” guideline54 was the birth of an 
immunity doctrine that would continue to plague the Supreme 
 
 45  Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 417–18 (1976) (summarizing the holding of 
Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 367 (1951)).  
 46  See Tenney, 341 U.S. at 376–79 (expressing disbelief at the notion “that 
Congress—itself a staunch advocate of legislative freedom—would impinge on a 
tradition so well grounded in history and reason by covert inclusion in the general 
language [of § 1983]”). 
 47  See Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 553–55 (1967) (comparing legislative and 
judicial immunity at common law, explaining that “[t]he immunity of judges for acts 
within the judicial role is equally well established, and we presume that Congress would 
have specifically so provided had it wished to abolish the doctrine”). 
 48  See Imbler, 424 U.S. at 421–27. 
 49  See Pierson, 386 U.S. at 555–57. 
 50  Id. at 549–50. 
 51  See id. at 555–57. 
 52  See id. at 555 (noting that “[t]he common law has never granted police officers 
an absolute and unqualified immunity”). 
 53  See Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S 232, 242 (1974) (“Implicit in the idea that 
officials have some immunity—absolute or qualified—for their acts, is a recognition 
that they may err.”). 
 54  Id. at 245. 
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Court,55 to baffle lower federal courts,56 and to consume considerable 
judicial resources57 in the ensuing decades. 
Seven years later, the Court undertook its first qualified immunity 
analysis since Pierson.58  In Scheuer v. Rhodes, the Court clarified the 
application of the doctrine, explaining that there were two criteria that 
must be met for an official to be eligible for immunity: (1) he must 
have had a reasonable basis for the belief in light of all circumstances 
existing at the time; and (2) he must have believed in good faith that 
the action was lawful.59  Put another way, the Court engaged in a two-
pronged analysis that assessed the official’s allegedly unconstitutional 
act under both objective and subjective standards.60  The Court further 
expounded this two-part test shortly thereafter, explaining that 
entitlement to immunity requires that an official act with a sincere 
belief that he is doing right, and he must not have violated a well-
settled constitutional right—even if the violation resulted from 
ignorance or indifference.61 
These early cases justified qualified immunity on two primary 
bases, both of which were rooted in the rationales of traditional 
common law: fairness and overdeterrence.62  The Court explained that 
 
 55  See generally Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 223 (2009); Saucier v. Katz, 533 
U.S. 194, 194 (2001); Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 800 (1982). 
 56  See, e.g., Curley v. Klem, 499 F.3d 199, 208–09 (3d Cir. 2007) (noting the Circuit 
split regarding whether judges or juries should decide if qualified immunity applies); 
Harbert Int’l v. James, 157 F.3d 1271, 1285–86 (11th Cir. 1998) (disagreeing with the 
Sixth and Ninth Circuits’ interpretations of Davis v. Scherer, 468 U.S. 183 (1984)); 
DiMeglio v. Haines, 45 F.3d 790, 795–97 (4th Cir. 1995) (surveying the interpretations 
of eight different Courts of Appeal to Siegert v. Gilley, 500 U.S. 226 (1991) and 
asserting disagreement with all of those constructions of the Court’s holding).  
 57  See Alan K. Chen, The Burdens of Qualified Immunity: Summary Judgment and the 
Role of Facts in Constitutional Tort Law, 47 AM. U. L. REV. 1, 2 (1997) (noting that federal 
courts have used increasingly more resources for adjudicating immunity claims in 
recent years); Charles T. Putnam & Charles T. Ferris, Defending a Maligned Defense: The 
Policy Bases of the Qualified Immunity Defense in Actions Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, 12 
BRIDGEPORT L. REV. 665, 670 (1992) (describing the scarcity of judicial resources but 
the ever-increasing number of § 1983 cases filed in “overburdened federal courts”).  
See also Table C-3: U.S. District Courts—Civil Cases Commenced, by Nature of Suit and District, 
During the 12-Month Period Ending March 31, 2015, U.S. CTS., 
http://www.uscourts.gov/statistics/table/c-3/federal-judicial-caseload-
statistics/2015/03/31 (last visited Jan. 2, 2017) (follow “Download Data Table” 
hyperlink) (Excluding prisoner petitions, 36,841 of the 281,608 civil cases 
(approximately thirteen percent) filed in District Courts from April 1, 2014, to March 
31, 2015, were described as “Civil Rights” cases).  
 58  See Scheuer, 416 U.S. at 232. 
 59  See id. at 247–48. 
 60  See Chen, supra note 57, at 19. 
 61  See Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 321–22 (1975). 
 62  See Scheuer, explaining that official immunity at common law was based on: 
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public officials, from police officers to governors, “who fail to make 
decisions when they are needed or who do not act to implement 
decisions when they are made do not fully and faithfully perform the 
duties of their offices.”63  The Court further expounded that the 
immunity doctrine recognizes that officials will sometimes make 
mistakes and, accordingly, gives them room to err in the performance 
of their duties based on the assumption “it is better to risk some error 
and possible injury from such error than [for an official] not to decide 
or act at all.”64  The Court’s justification demonstrates its concern that 
officials would fail to make important decisions or take necessary 
actions for fear of incurring civil liability, and that the public good 
would ultimately suffer.65  In essence, qualified immunity avoids 
“placing police officers between the proverbial rock and a hard place” 
when tension arises between the officer’s law enforcement 
responsibilities and his constitutional obligations.66 
But a mere seven years after deciding Wood v. Strickland, the Court 
significantly altered its qualified immunity jurisprudence when it 
wholly abandoned the two-part objective-subjective test in favor of a 
purely objective analysis: officials would be entitled to immunity so 
long as they did not violate clearly established constitutional or 
statutory rights of which a reasonable person would have known.67  The 
Court’s adjusted analysis seems to mirror a shift in its predominant 
policy concerns.68  The Court became less concerned with unfairness 
and over-deterring officials, and more concerned with the substantial 
social burdens at stake in unrestricted litigation of claims against 
government officials, such as financing the official’s defense, diverting 
 
[T]wo mutually dependent rationales: (1) the injustice . . . of subjecting 
to liability an officer who is required, by . . . his position, to exercise 
discretion; (2) the danger that the threat of such liability would deter his 
willingness to execute his office with the decisiveness and the judgment 
required by the public good. 
See Scheuer, 416 U.S. at 240.  See also Chen, supra note 57, at 15 (noting that qualified 
immunity jurisprudence in the Supreme Court “began with a focus on fairness and 
overdeterrence rationales”). 
 63  Scheuer, 416. U.S. at 241–42. 
 64  Id. at 242. 
 65  See Wood, 420 U.S. at 319–20 (“The imposition of monetary costs for mistakes 
which were not unreasonable in the light of all the circumstances would undoubtedly 
deter even the most conscientious school decisionmaker from exercising his judgment 
independently, forcefully, and in a manner best serving the long term interest . . . .”). 
 66  Chen, supra note 57, at 16. 
 67  See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). 
 68  See Chen, supra note 57, at 17–18 (“While fairness and overdeterrence still play 
a formal role in the Court’s immunity jurisprudence, their function as the driving force 
behind qualified immunity was severely diminished after Harlow.”). 
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official efforts from important public matters, and dissuading capable 
individuals from seeking public office.69  The Court reasoned that 
inquiring into the official’s subjective state was incompatible70 with the 
effective balancing of important social costs and the individual’s right 
to sue an official for violations of his constitutional liberties, requiring 
the elimination of the subjective “good faith” prong of the qualified 
immunity test.71 
Though it has been tweaked somewhat along the way, Harlow v. 
Fitzgerald represents the modern test for qualified immunity.  The 
current standard for qualified immunity involves two different 
questions, both of which must be answered affirmatively in order for a 
plaintiff’s suit to proceed against an official: (1) Did the defendant 
violate the plaintiff’s constitutional right?; and (2) Was a constitutional 
right clearly established at the time of the violation?72  In its most recent 
formulation, these questions do not need to be answered 
sequentially,73 and the Court has left the order of inquiry to the 
discretion of the district courts.74 
IV. THE PROBLEMS WITH QUALIFIED IMMUNITY 
The legal academic community has criticized the qualified 
immunity doctrine on a number of grounds since at least the 1980s.75  
Despite these criticisms, in recent years—and particularly since the 
beginning of the Roberts era76—the Court has made it ever more 
difficult to impose liability on law enforcement officers alleged to have 
acted unconstitutionally.77  This extension of the doctrine has occurred 
 
 69  Harlow, 457 U.S. at 814. 
 70  See id. at 815–18 (explaining why a subjective intent can so rarely be decided on 
summary judgment and discussing the disruptive effects to government that broad-
ranging discovery to uncover subjective states of mind can have). 
 71  See id. at 814–15 (“[T]he dismissal of insubstantial lawsuits without trial—a 
factor presupposed in the balance of competing interests struck by our prior cases—
requires an adjustment of the ‘good faith’ standard established by our decisions.”). 
 72  Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 232 (2009). 
 73  The Court does, however, state that it is “often beneficial” to answer the two 
questions in the above specified order.  Id. at 236. 
 74  See id. at 236–43. 
 75  See, e.g., Alan K. Chen, The Facts About Qualified Immunity, 55 EMORY L.J. 229, 233 
(2006) (condemning the “lack of transparency” in the Court’s manipulation of the 
qualified immunity doctrine and its disregard of the critical role that facts play in the 
qualified immunity analysis); Rudovsky, supra note 24, at 27 (criticizing the limitations 
on constitutional torts that the Court’s qualified immunity doctrine has imposed and 
the potential danger that qualified immunity will redefine substantive constitutional 
law). 
 76  See supra note 43. 
 77  See Erwin Chemerinsky, Closing the Courthouse Doors, 41 HUM. RTS. 5, 5 (2014). 
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gradually.  The decisions that have perpetrated the expansion might 
even appear unrelated; but they have nevertheless resulted in one 
overarching thematic problem:  a lack of accountability. 
A. The Surprising Lack of Clarity of the “Clearly Established” Right 
One problem with qualified immunity results from the so-called 
two-pronged inquiry.  In 2001, concerned that disposal of cases based 
solely on the “clearly established” prong would “stunt the 
development” of constitutional law, the Court mandated that lower 
courts first decide whether there was a constitutional violation before 
determining whether the right was clearly established.78  The Saucier v. 
Katz decision was unpopular,79 to say the least, and in 2009, the Court 
unanimously overruled the decision and once again left the 
procedural sequence to the discretion of lower courts.80  But because 
courts are no longer required to address the two-part inquiry in any 
particular order, the practical effect has been precisely what the Court 
feared in its Saucier decision: frequent disposal of cases based on the 
perceived lack of a “clearly established” right without ever addressing 
the merits of the constitutional claim.81 
A recent survey of circuit court cases decided since the 2009 
Pearson v. Callahan decision demonstrates the frequency with which 
lower courts dispose of cases based on a lack of a clearly established 
law.82  The study, which analyzed 844 published and unpublished 
courts of appeal opinions decided between 2009 and 2012, 
encompassing 1,460 total claims, found that courts granted qualified 
immunity in 1,055 of the claims, or approximately 72% of the time.83  
In 534 (or nearly 51%) of the claims wherein a court granted 
immunity, the court concluded that the right asserted was not clearly 
established.84  So in more than half of the claims in which courts 
granted immunity, the basis for the holding was the absence of clearly 
established law. 
 
 78  See Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001). 
 79  Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 234–35 (2009) (noting that lower court 
judges “have not been reticent in their criticism,” that application of the Saucier rule 
“has not always been enthusiastic,” and that even some members of the Court were 
critical). 
 80  Id. at 236. 
 81  See James E. Pfander, Resolving the Qualified Immunity Dilemma: Constitutional Tort 
Claims for Nominal Damages, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 1601, 1602–03 (2011). 
 82  See Aaron L. Nielson & Christopher J. Walker, The New Qualified Immunity, 89 S. 
CAL. L. REV. 1, 30–32 (2015). 
 83  Id. 
 84  See id. at 31–32. 
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But perhaps somewhat ironically, the concept of a “clearly” 
established right is in and of itself less than clear, and a great deal of 
confusion exists over what rights fall within this vague classification.85  
In essence, approximately fifty percent of the time,86 a court’s decision 
to grant immunity to an official is based on a muddled and uncertain 
legal precept.  To qualify as clearly established, “a right must be 
sufficiently clear that every reasonable official would have understood 
that what he is doing violates that right.”87  There are few unambiguous 
bright-line rules in modern constitutional jurisprudence.  Instead, 
most doctrines are articulated as relatively vague standards or 
balancing tests.88  In addition, because there are considerable 
distinctions in the structure, aim, and available alternative remedies of 
various constitutional rights, the general-purpose nature of qualified 
immunity is problematic.89  Defining a clearly established law is 
straightforward when the right is laid out in a stable and fairly specific 
doctrine, but when the rule changes, the new law only becomes clearly 
established when a clarifying court decision is handed down.90  When 
such constitutional rights are violated, qualified immunity allows 
officials to avoid liability because of a failure to anticipate 
developments in the law.91  And although the Court held in 2002 that 
there need not be a case on point in order to find clearly established 
law,92 it has nevertheless continued to grant qualified immunity in the 
absence of similar precedent.93  Unsurprisingly, lower courts struggle 
with the question of whether a right is clearly established, and the 
circuits have developed markedly varying approaches to the inquiry.94 
Finally, despite multiple attempts to clarify the doctrine over the 
years, it seems that the Supreme Court has only further added to the 
confusion of lower courts.  Indeed, almost without fail, Supreme Court 
cases since Pearson have apparently further expanded the qualified 
immunity doctrine by upholding its application in all manner of 
 
 85  See Alan K. Chen, The Ultimate Standard: Qualified Immunity in the Age of 
Constitutional Balancing Tests, 81 IOWA L. REV. 261, 329 (1995). 
 86  This percentage assumes the reliability of the aforementioned survey.  
 87  Taylor v. Barkes, 135 S. Ct. 2042, 2044 (2015). 
 88  See Chen, supra note 57, at 50. 
 89  See Jeffries, supra note 27, at 859. 
 90  See id. 
 91  Id. 
 92  See Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 741 (2002) (explaining that “officials can still 
be on notice that their conduct violates established law even in novel factual 
circumstances”). 
 93  See Chemerinsky, supra note 77, at 6. 
 94  See Jeffries, supra note 27, at 852 (“[D]etermining whether an officer violated 
‘clearly established’ law has proved to be a mare’s nest of complexity and confusion.”). 
DE STEFAN (DO NOT DELETE) 2/21/2017  10:10 AM 
2017] COMMENT 557 
diverse situations—seemingly in every set of circumstances with which 
it has been presented.95 
B. An Overconfidence in Overdeterrence 
The judicial system’s somewhat naïve faith in the power of civil 
suits as a deterrent has inadvertently produced another problem in 
qualified immunity jurisprudence.96  This belief has generated concern 
in the Supreme Court about overdeterrence—the notion that fear of 
being sued “is so strong that it can ‘dampen the ardor of all but the 
most resolute, or the most irresponsible [public officials], in the 
unflinching discharge of their duties.’”97  This trepidation about too 
much deterrence and its potentially chilling effect on government 
operations has played a powerful role in shaping Court decisions 
toward limiting civil remedies.98  Of course, lawsuits are intended to 
have this deterrent effect—indeed, they are relied upon to have such 
effect as part of our system of accountability for government officials.  
Unfortunately, reality suggests that the deterrent power of lawsuits is 
not quite as potent as the Supreme Court envisions.99 
The Court specifically fears that financial liability, in the form of 
paying compensatory damages to victims whose constitutional rights 
were violated by an officer, will be a vehicle of overdeterrence.100  The 
widespread practice of indemnification, however, means that 
individual officers are almost never financially responsible for civil 
judgments against them, practically eliminating any fiscal motivation 
 
 95  See, e.g., Taylor v. Barkes, 135 S. Ct. 2042, 2045 (2015) (holding that prison 
officials were entitled to qualified immunity after failing to prevent an inmate’s death 
because “[e]ven if the [prison’s] suicide screening and prevention measures 
contained . . . shortcomings” there was no precedent at the time that would have made 
it clear that the system was unconstitutional”); Reichle v. Howards, 132 S. Ct. 2088, 
2094 (2012) (officers entitled to qualified immunity because the Court has never held 
that there is a “right to be free from a retaliatory arrest that is otherwise supported by 
probable cause”); Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 741 (2011) (former Attorney 
General entitled to qualified immunity where he detained terrorism suspects using the 
pretext of a federal material-witness statute because the arrest was objectively 
reasonable even if it was improperly motivated). 
 96  See Joanna C. Schwartz, Myths and Mechanics of Deterrence: The Role of Lawsuits in 
Law Enforcement Decisionmaking, 57 UCLA L. REV. 1023, 1024–25 (2010) (explaining 
that the Court believes that being sued or even the threat of being sued is enough to 
make officials act within the laws). 
 97  Id. at 1025 (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 813 (1982)). 
 98  See id. 
 99  See Joanna C. Schwartz, Police Indemnification, 89 N.Y.U. L. REV. 885, 894 n.41 
(2014) (explaining that the Court has never given any empirical evidence to support 
its belief in the deterrent power of lawsuits). 
 100  See id. at 893. 
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for avoiding harmful conduct.101  In fact, in many instances, even the 
police department that employs the officer suffers no direct financial 
consequences because police litigation costs and damages awards are 
often paid from a city or insurer’s general budget.102  Therefore, the 
police department is not financially penalized, and thus has no 
incentive to discipline the officer or attempt to prevent him from 
repeating the unconstitutional behavior in the future.  And because 
law enforcement officials are often unaware of the allegations set forth 
in lawsuits filed against them or their employees, officers’ conduct 
often goes uninvestigated and undisciplined, and allegations of 
unconstitutional conduct do not affect performance reviews or 
opportunities for promotion.103  Finally, although many law 
enforcement officers claim that the threat of incurring liability deters 
them from misconduct, studies contrarily indicate that potential 
liability does not actually alter most officers’ on-the-job actions.104 
C. The Unintended Upshot of a Universally Applicable Standard 
Although many of the weaknesses of qualified immunity can, for 
the most part, be considered unintended consequences, one 
significant flaw was the Court’s deliberate decision to utilize a one-size-
fits-all standard.  In early qualified immunity decisions, the Court 
acknowledged the possibility that the doctrine might apply differently 
depending on the type of official involved in a particular situation.105  
But, as it so commonly does, the Court altered its approach.  For nearly 
four decades, the Court has applied the qualified immunity doctrine 
as a standard applicable to all officials who do not enjoy absolute 
immunity.106  Indeed, the Court has been explicit about its 
unwillingness “to complicate qualified immunity analysis by making 
the scope or extent of immunity turn on the precise nature of various 
 
 101  See id. at 938–40. 
 102  Id. at 957. 
 103  See Schwartz, supra note 96, at 1076–77. 
 104  Id. at 1077–78. 
 105  See Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 247 (1974) (“[I]n varying scope, a qualified 
immunity is available to officers of the executive branch of government, the variation 
being dependent upon the scope of discretion and responsibilities of the office and 
all the circumstances as they reasonably appeared at the time . . . .”); Pierson v. Ray, 
386 U.S. 547, 554–55 (1967) (distinguishing judges, who are entitled to absolute 
immunity, and police officers, who enjoy good-faith immunity); Chen, supra note 85, 
at 287–89. 
 106  See Procunier v. Navarette, 434 U.S. 555, 561–62 (1978) (explaining that officials 
not entitled to absolute immunity “could rely only on the qualified immunity 
described” in earlier cases); Chen, supra note 85, at 289. 
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officials’ duties.”107  In so doing, the Court has overextended the 
doctrine.  It is essentially providing too much protection for lower-level 
officers because all officials not entitled to absolute immunity now 
enjoy immunity that the Court “ha[d] developed for a quite different 
group of high public office holders.”108  This is perhaps most 
problematic when a plaintiff alleges Fourth Amendment violations 
because the qualified immunity doctrine provides officers with two 
layers of liability protection: qualified immunity’s reasonableness 
standard on top of the reasonableness already embodied in Fourth 
Amendment substantive law.109 
D. Annihilating Accountability 
Of course, the most outwardly evident and alarming problem with 
qualified immunity jurisprudence has been its cumulative erosion of 
law enforcement accountability.  Perhaps Erwin Chemerinsky 
summarized it best when he noted that “[i]n recent years, the court 
has made it very difficult, and often impossible, to hold police officers 
and the governments that employ them accountable for civil rights 
violations.”110  Many of the aforementioned procedural and substantive 
problems with the qualified immunity doctrine have contributed to 
what might be considered a deleterious byproduct.  But recent Court 
decisions have also demonstrated a willingness to extend immunity in 
even the most egregious circumstances.111 
For example, in Plumhoff v. Rickard, the Court held that three 
officers did not use excessive force and were entitled to qualified 
immunity when they had collectively fired fifteen shots at a fleeing car, 
causing the deaths of the driver and passenger.112  The incident ensued 
 
 107  Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 643 (1987). 
 108  Id. at 647 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 109  See Chen, supra note 85, at 296. 
 110  Erwin Chemerinsky, How the Supreme Court Protects Bad Cops, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 26, 
2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/27/opinion/how-the-supreme-court-
protects-bad-cops.html?_r=0. 
 111  See, e.g., City & Cty. of San Francisco v. Sheehan, 135 S. Ct. 1765, 1774–78 (2015) 
(officers forcibly entered a mentally disabled woman’s room and shot her several 
times); Carroll v. Carman, 135 S. Ct. 348, 349–50 (2014) (per curiam) (officers went 
into a private backyard and onto the deck without a warrant because an alleged car 
thief “might have fled” there); Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 374–86 (2007) (officer 
ended a car chase by running the driver off the road and rendering him a 
quadriplegic).  See also Susan Bendlin, Qualified Immunity: Protecting “All But the Plainly 
Incompetent” (and Maybe Some of Them, Too), 45 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 1023, 1023 (2012) 
(opining that “[p]ublic officials can be more certain than ever before that qualified 
immunity will shield them from suits for money damages even if their actions violate 
the constitutional rights of another”).  
 112  Plumhoff v. Rickard, 134 S. Ct. 2012, 2017–18, 2021–24 (2014). 
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after one of the officers stopped the vehicle for having only one 
working headlight and, rather than exit the vehicle as the officer 
instructed, the driver instead sped away, prompting the officer and 
several others to give chase.113  The Supreme Court disagreed with the 
district court and the court of appeals, which had both concluded that 
the officers used excessive force in violation of the Fourth 
Amendment.114  In overturning the courts below, the Supreme Court 
reasoned that the use of deadly force was permissible because the 
driver “posed a grave public safety risk” and that firing fifteen times 
was not unreasonable because “the officers need not stop shooting 
until the threat is over.”115  Somewhat similarly, in Brosseau v. Haugen, 
the Court held that an officer was entitled to immunity when she shot 
an unarmed man in the back through the window of his Jeep—which 
was not moving116—as a means of preventing his escape.117  The Court  
acknowledged that  the officer’s actions probably “fell in the ‘hazy 
border between excessive and acceptable force,’” but that previous 
Court decisions “by no means ‘clearly establish’ that Brosseau’s 
conduct violated the Fourth Amendment.”118 
V. THE PROBLEM OF POLICE USE OF FORCE 
The qualified immunity doctrine presents myriad problems in 
both its conception and application, such that this Comment could not 
hope to address them all.  But those mentioned in the previous section 
are among those of particular relevance to the recent questions 
surrounding police misconduct.  Indeed, the link between police 
violence and the vast confusion regarding “clearly established” rights, 
or of giving lower courts complete discretion to address the two-
pronged test in whichever order they see fit, might not be obvious at 
first blush.  But it is not difficult to see how qualified immunity’s 
gradual deterioration of law enforcement’s accountability plays a role 
in the current predicament between the police and those they are 
tasked with policing. 
 
 113  Id. at 2017. 
 114  Id. at 2016–17. 
 115  Id. at 2021–22.  The Court also reasoned that the presence of a passenger in the 
front seat should play no part in its analysis.  Id. at 2022. 
 116  Despite the fact that the vehicle was not moving, the officer nevertheless 
claimed that she shot Haugen in the back because she was “‘fearful for the other 
officers on foot who [she] believed were in the immediate area, [and] for the occupied 
vehicles in [Haugen’s] path and for any other citizens who might be in the area.’”  
Brosseau v. Haugen, 543 U.S. 194, 197 (2004) (per curiam). 
 117  Id. at 195–97. 
 118  Id. at 201 (quoting Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 206 (2001)).  
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A. The President’s Task Force on 21st Century Policing Prescribes Trust 
and Legitimacy 
In response to the officer-perpetrated violence and the national 
reaction thereto, President Obama created the Task Force on 21st 
Century Policing119 in December 2014, to determine best practices for 
strengthening relationships between law enforcement and the public 
while also aiming to reduce crime.120  In its Final Report, the Task Force 
set forth myriad recommendations and action steps to implement such 
recommendations, all of which aim at a paramount umbrella objective:  
fostering trust and legitimacy between the police and the communities 
they serve.121  The Final Report is comprehensive in that it covers six 
general topics and recommends collaboration not only among the 
various levels of government,122 but between individual law 
enforcement agencies and local schools,123 higher-learning 
institutions,124 other local jurisdictions,125 and individual and corporate 
members of the community.126  But the scope of the Task Force’s 
assignment was limited to police-community interactions, and it 
advocates for holistic evaluation of the criminal justice system in order 
to determine a plan for comprehensive criminal justice reform.127 
Establishing police accountability is a palpable recurring theme 
of the Final Report.  For example, the Task Force encourages law 
enforcement agencies to foster transparency and ensure accountability 
by making departmental policies freely available to citizens, regularly 
posting data about stops, summonses, arrests, crime, and the like on 
the department website, and promptly and candidly communicating 
with the community about serious incidents—including alleged officer 
 
 119  See generally Community Oriented Policing Services Office, President’s Task Force, 
U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., http://www.cops.usdoj.gov/policingtaskforce (last visited Apr. 24, 
2016). 
 120  See Press Release, Fact Sheet: Task Force on 21st Century Policing (Dec. 18, 
2014), https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/12/18/fact-sheet-task-
force-21st-century-policing. 
 121  See PRESIDENT’S TASK FORCE ON 21ST CENTURY POLICING, FINAL REPORT OF THE 
PRESIDENT’S TASK FORCE ON 21ST CENTURY POLICING 1–4 (2015) [hereinafter TASK 
FORCE]. 
 122  See id. at 7–8. 
 123  See id. at 15, 41–43, 47–49, 50. 
 124  See id. at 16, 55, 59, 95–96. 
 125  See id. at 28–29, 90. 
 126  See, e.g., id. at 19–20, 26, 35, 44–46. 
 127  See TASK FORCE, supra note 121, at 5–8.  The Task Force noted that many citizens 
think of police as the “face” of the criminal justice system, and may blame the police 
for policies with which they disagree such as drug laws, sentencing protocol, and 
incarceration rules.  Id. at 7. 
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misconduct.128  Additionally, the Task Force emphasizes the need for 
policy reform to control the use of police force and urges departments 
to mandate external, independent criminal investigations for cases of 
officer-involved shootings, in-custody deaths, and fatal use of force in 
order to demonstrate transparency and rebuild trust.129 
B. The Police and the Policed: A Relationship in Need of Repair 
Unsurprisingly, police shootings generally tend to produce 
tension between the police and the policed.130  That most of the 
incidents propagated through various forms of media since 2014 have 
involved the deaths of unarmed citizens at the hands of police131 has 
only made matters worse.  Regardless of whether the number of police 
slayings has in fact increased, or whether the media is simply giving 
more attention to such occurrences, the general relationships between 
law enforcement agencies and communities nationwide are likely even 
further strained than in the case of more isolated, or seemingly more 
isolated, events.132  In addition, multiple declinations of grand juries to 
indict officers involved in high-profile slayings of unarmed citizens has 
further exacerbated the problem, inciting outrage, inspiring 
protests,133 and raising critical questions about the extent of police 
accountability.134 
 
 128  See id. at 13. 
 129  See id. at 19, 21. 
 130  See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, SHIELDED FROM JUSTICE: POLICE BRUTALITY AND 
ACCOUNTABILITY IN THE UNITED STATES 74 (1998). 
 131  See, e.g., Larry Buchanan et al., What Happened in Ferguson?, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 10, 
2015), http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2014/08/13/us/ferguson-missouri-
town-under-siege-after-police-shooting.html?_r=0; Justin Fenton, Autopsy of Freddie Gray 
Shows “High-Energy” Impact, BALT. SUN (June 24, 2015, 10:25 AM), 
http://www.baltimoresun.com/news/maryland/freddie-gray/bs-md-ci-freddie-gray-
autopsy-20150623-story.html; Abby Ohlheiser, Death of Tamir Rice, 12-Year-Old Shot by 
Cleveland Police, Ruled a Homicide, WASH. POST (Dec. 12, 2014), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-nation/wp/2014/12/12/death-of-
tamir-rice-12-year-old-shot-by-cleveland-police-ruled-a-homicide/. 
 132  See Walter Katz, Enhancing Accountability and Trust with Independent Investigations 
of Police Lethal Force, 128 HARV. L. REV. 235, 236 (2015) (discussing how apparent racial 
targeting by police generates distrust, which boils over from time to time—for 
example, in 2014 in response to the deaths of Eric Garner, Michael Brown, and several 
other high-profile police slayings). 
 133  See Julie Bosman & Emma G. Fitzsimmons, Grief and Protests Follow Shooting of a 
Teenager, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 10, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/11/us/ 
police-say-mike-brown-was-killed-after-struggle-for-gun.html; J. David Goodman & Al 
Baker, Wave of Protests After Grand Jury Doesn’t Indict Officer in Eric Garner Chokehold Case, 
N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 3, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/04/nyregion/grand-
jury-said-to-bring-no-charges-in-staten-island-chokehold-death-of-eric-
garner.html?_r=0. 
 134  See Vincent Warren, Building Trust and Legitimacy: Listening Session before the 
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Unfortunately, while the FBI plans to improve its system for 
gathering information about the use of force by law enforcement by 
2017, its data collection up to this point has been less-than-stellar.135  
And although the Washington Post undertook a year-long investigation 
in 2015 in order to accurately track the number of fatal shootings by 
on-duty police officers,136 the fallibility of previous federal data makes 
it impossible to ascertain how that total compares to prior years.137  
Moreover, the Post’s report does not include other types of deaths at 
the hands of police, such as in-custody deaths138 or deaths resulting 
from Tasers.139  However, it is noteworthy that the Post’s figure of 986 
lethal police shootings is more than double the FBI’s average annual 
tally for the preceding decade.140  So, if nothing else, this stark disparity 
reveals that such occurrences are substantially more prevalent than 
anyone was aware. 
Of course, the Post’s figures are subject to varying interpretations, 
each of which has some merit.  Some may consider the recent 
shootings to be an unfortunate but nonetheless routine consequence 
of enforcing the laws.  On the other hand, nationwide protests141 have 
 
President’s Task Force on 21st Century Policing, CENTERFORCONSTITUTIONALRIGHTS 3–4 
(Jan. 9, 2015), http://www.ccrjustice.org/sites/default/files/assets/files/CCR 
Testimony_PolicingTaskforce_20150113Final.pdf (explaining that the repeated 
failure of grand juries to indict officers who engage in brutality, and the grant of 
immunity to some officers involved in Eric Garner’s death “demonstrate a worrying 
lack of accountability or consequence for police misconduct”).  
 135  Kimberly Kindy et al., A Year of Reckoning: Police Fatally Shoot Nearly 1,000, WASH. 
POST (Dec. 26, 2015), http://www.washingtonpost.com/sf/investigative/2015/12/26 
/a-year-of-reckoning-police-fatally-shoot-nearly-1000/. 
 136  See Sandhya Somashekhar & Steven Rich, Final Tally: Police Shot and Killed 986 
People in 2015, WASH. POST (Jan. 6, 2016, 6:38 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/ 
national/final-tally-police-shot-and-killed-984-people-in-2015/2016/01/05/3ec7a404-
b3c5-11e5-a76a-0b5145e8679a_story.html.  
 137  In other words, it is truly impossible to determine whether there have actually 
been more police shootings of civilians, or whether the media has simply been giving 
more coverage to these incidents. 
 138  Forty-seven people were killed in police custody in the United States in 2015.  
The Counted: People Killed by Police in the US, THE GUARDIAN, 
http://www.theguardian.com/us-news/ng-interactive/2015/jun/01/the-counted-
police-killings-us-database (last visited Jan. 15, 2016). 
 139  Fifty people died as a result of officers with Tasers in 2015.  Id. 
 140  Id. 
 141  See, e.g., Lauren Gambino et al., Thousands March to Protest Against Police Brutality 
in Major US Cities, THE GUARDIAN (Dec. 14, 2014, 10:58 AM), http://www.theguardian 
.com/us-news/2014/dec/13/marchers-protest-police-brutality-new-york-washington-
boston; William Mathis, Hundreds Rally in New York City to Protest Police Brutality, 
HUFFINGTON POST (Oct. 24, 2015, 7:57 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/ 
rise-up-october-rally-nyc_us_562c0fd9e4b0aac0b8fd23f3; Protests Follow Decision Not to 
File Charges in Minneapolis Police Shooting, CBS (Mar. 30, 2016, 8:02 PM), 
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demonstrated that many others consider civilian deaths at the hands 
of police officers to be an insult to constitutional rights.  And surely 
the opinions of many Americans lie somewhere on the spectrum in 
between.  While the statistical truth may forever remain a mystery, one 
thing is clear:  the need for change.142  The American public has lost 
trust in its law enforcement, not only because of the perceived 
frequency of the use of lethal force, but because of subsequent 
investigations into such incidents, which many view as biased.143  The 
nation is calling for reform,144 and various government agencies,145 
branches of local government,146 and even the President147 have 
responded to the outcry.  But although the need for change has been 
 
http://www.cbsnews.com/news/jamar-clark-protests-follow-decision-not-to-file-
charges-in-minneapolis-police-shooting/. 
 142  The urgent necessity is demonstrated by the handful of police departments 
nationally, including Philadelphia, Seattle, and San Francisco, which have already 
begun implementing specific recommendations of the Task Force.  See Community 
Oriented Policing Services Office, Task Force Recommendations Implementation Map, U.S. 
DEP’T OF JUST., http://www.cops.usdoj.gov/Default.asp?Item=2827# (last visited Feb. 
10, 2016). 
 143  See Katz, supra note 132, at 235. 
 144  See, e.g., Michelle Basch, Demonstrators Call for Change at Public Hearing on Fairfax 
Police Practices, WTOP (Sept. 15, 2015, 1:39 AM), http://wtop.com/fairfax-county/ 
2015/09/demonstrators-call-for-change-at-public-hearing-on-fairfax-police-
practices/slide/1/; Phil Helsel, Former Tennis Star James Blake Calls for Police Change After 
Mistaken Arrest, NBC NEWS (Sept. 11, 2015, 9:41 PM), http://www.nbcnews.com/news/ 
us-news/former-tennis-star-james-blake-calls-nyc-police-change-after-n426211; 
Meghan Keneally & Evan Simon, Law Enforcement Analysts Call for Changes to Police 
Training After Recent Incidents, ABC NEWS (May 5, 2015, 6:23 PM), http://abcnews.go. 
com/News/law-enforcement-analysts-call-police-training-recent-
incidents/story?id=30827523. 
 145  See, e.g., Mark Berman et al., Justice Department Sues the City of Ferguson to Force 
Policing Reform, WASH. POST (Feb. 11, 2016, 7:52 AM), https://www.washingtonpost 
.com/news/post-nation/wp/2016/02/10/ferguson-demands-changes-to-agreement-
reforming-police-tactics-justice-dept-criticizes-unnecessary-delay/; Kindy et al., supra 
note 135. 
 146  See, e.g., Ralph Ellis et al., After Fatal Shootings by Police, Chicago Mayor Calls for 
Changes in Officer Training, CNN (Dec. 27, 2015), http://www.cnn.com/2015/12/27/ 
us/chicago-police-shooting/; Jayne Miller, Baltimore Mayor Pushes for Changes to Fire 
Police Officers, WBAL-TV (Oct. 21, 2015, 6:11 PM), http://www.wbaltv.com/news/ 
baltimore-mayor-pushes-for-changes-to-fire-police-officers/35968256. 
 147  See Julie Hirschfeld Davis, Obama Calls for Changes in Policing After Task Force 
Report, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 2, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/03/03/us/politics/ 
obama-calls-for-changes-in-policing-after-task-force-report.html?_r=0 (urging local law 
enforcement to consider independent criminal investigations and independent 
prosecutors in situations involving police use of force); Alex Johnson, Obama: U.S. 
Cracking Down on ‘Militarization’ of Local Police, NBC NEWS (May 18, 2015, 7:23 PM), 
http://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/u-s-cracking-down-militarization-local-
police-n360381 (barring the federal government from providing local law 
enforcement with tanks, grenade launchers, and other heavy military equipment). 
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duly acknowledged, the question of how to implement comprehensive 
reform on a national scale remains largely unresolved. 
VI. AMENDING QUALIFIED IMMUNITY DOCTRINE AS A CATALYST FOR 
CURBING POLICE VIOLENCE 
Altering the qualified immunity doctrine is an excellent way to 
begin the path to restoring trust by establishing a much-needed sense 
of accountability.  Civil remedies are a good starting point because, as 
repeated failures to indict officers—even where video footage of the 
incident exists—have demonstrated, accountability under the criminal 
law is a far-off possibility, if it is possible at all.  Prosecutors are generally 
disinclined to bring charges against law enforcement officers,148 and 
grand juries are equally as hesitant to indict them.149  Independent 
investigations, as suggested by the Task Force, are an excellent idea, 
but establishing a feasible system nationwide would take both time and 
the cooperation of thousands of local law enforcement divisions 
nationwide.  On the other hand, the Supreme Court could begin to 
relax the stringent immunity afforded to police officers with a single 
opinion, and could thus be implemented relatively quickly. 
Of course, this is easier said than done.  The Court has 
increasingly enlarged the immunity afforded to police officers in its 
recent decisions, and any 180-degree turnaround would likely require 
a change in Court composition.  Nevertheless, the current Court can 
reinvigorate the usefulness of civil remedies for constitutional 
violations by simply providing more guidance and clarification 
regarding qualified immunity.  In elucidating the contours of the 
doctrine and demonstrating its proper application, the Court can 
enhance accountability and help to repair trust between law 
enforcement and their respective communities. 
The concept of a clearly established right is, in many ways, a 
problem that requires solving.  A substantial number of cases are 
disposed of on the premise that a right was not “clearly established”—
yet lower courts have struggled for years with what those words actually 
 
 148  See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 130, at 85.  Reasons that prosecutors may 
opt not to pursue brutality charges against police officers include: (1) the typically 
close working relationship between district attorneys and officers; (2) difficulty in 
convincing juries that officers committed a crime (as opposed to merely making a 
mistake); and (3) lack of information about prosecutable cases or systems for reviewing 
potentially prosecutable cases.  Id. at 86.  
 149  See id. (explaining that even seemingly foolproof cases against on-duty officers 
can fail because of juries’ tendencies to support the police and their reluctance to find 
officers guilty on criminal charges). 
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mean.150  Arguably, then, at least some officers are escaping liability 
simply because of the Court’s repeated failures to establish consistency 
and clarity in its qualified immunity jurisprudence.  But if the Court 
used qualified immunity opinions to demonstrate what qualifies as a 
clearly established right by meticulously outlining its reasoning in 
answering whether a set of facts implicates such a right, the Court 
could alleviate some confusion.  In other words, rather than taking 
cases simply to overturn the lower courts’ denial of immunity, which 
arguably only further clouds the issue, it could take cases to affirm 
those denials or, alternatively, to reverse lower courts’ grant of 
immunity.  By so doing, the Court can give examples of what 
constitutes a right that is “sufficiently clear that every reasonable 
official would have understood that what he is doing violates that 
right,”151 and can give lower courts somewhat of a guide to follow. 
By elucidating the contours of the clearly established right, the 
Court would alleviate some of the confusion of lower courts and ensure 
that they are in fact applying that portion of the test properly.  Proper 
application of this prong directly promotes accountability, as the 
public can rest assured that, at least in that regard, cases are not being 
disposed of based merely on perplexity and uncertainty.  Moreover, 
increased confidence about the clearly established prong could foster 
a willingness to take on the second part of the test and, in so doing, 
advance the development of constitutional law and clarify further 
constitutional rights. 
The Court could also accept that its attempts at a general standard 
for all classes of officials that are not otherwise entitled to absolute 
immunity has been problematic and hugely unsuccessful.  Though the 
Court apparently fears “complicat[ing]” qualified immunity,152 the 
doctrine is obviously quite complicated as is, and adopting more 
particularized classes of officials with standards of immunity that are 
more appropriate to each would not only assist lower courts in properly 
analyzing immunity, but would promote justice in constitutional tort 
litigation.  For example, the Court could classify officials based on the 
approximate number of people with whom they come in contact, and 
that might therefore bring civil suits against them.153  A governor could 
 
 150  See supra note 94 and accompanying text. 
 151  Taylor v. Barkes, 135 S. Ct. 2042, 2044 (2015). 
 152  See supra note 107 and accompanying text. 
 153  See Mandery, supra note 44, at 514 (explaining that many concerns justifying 
qualified immunity for higher-level officials do not apply to lower-level officials, whose 
decisions typically only affect people they directly come into contact with, and whose 
tasks can be duplicated by other low-level officials, so any time spent defending a 
lawsuit is not an excessive governmental burden). 
DE STEFAN (DO NOT DELETE) 2/21/2017  10:10 AM 
2017] COMMENT 567 
theoretically face a lawsuit from any resident of the state because a 
governor’s decisions potentially affect all citizens of the state, such that 
more stringent protection—much like the standard afforded to all 
officials now—is appropriate.  But law enforcement officers, who come 
in contact with only the residents of one town, city, or perhaps 
county,154 risk possible suits from a much smaller pool of people.  The 
threat of litigation would therefore be much less crippling on 
governmental function, and immunity protection need not be so 
rigorous.  In the case of allegations of Fourth Amendment violations, 
in light of the already-existing reasonableness standard, immunity may 
be inappropriate altogether. 
In addition, the Court could do its proverbial homework and take 
notice of the widespread indemnification of officers that often results 
in a complete absence of financial or employment-related 
consequences for law enforcement.  If the Court stopped relying on its 
own intuition, and instead came to grip with the facts, it would likely 
realize that it has been overzealous in protecting low-level officers, and 
be inclined to alter course somewhat. 
By beginning to mend the qualified immunity doctrine in these 
ways, the Court will allow more civil suits for the vindication of 
constitutional rights to succeed.  This will help reduce the public 
mentality—strengthened by recent events—that cops get away with 
everything, in every regard.  Civil suits avoid subjecting law 
enforcement to the criminal liability that many laypersons believe is 
warranted.  While this may be true in select circumstances, reality 
demonstrates that criminal charges are highly unlikely to stick against 
a police officer.  But allowing more civil suits to go forward will serve 
as an important reminder to both civilians and law enforcement that 
the police are not above the law, and that they are held accountable 
for their wrongdoings.  In turn, this accountability will begin to heal 
the relationship between law enforcement and communities; it can 
serve as the first step on the long path to rebuilding the trust that is so 
crucial. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
By adopting different immunity standards for high-level and low-
level officials, clarifying the vagueness surrounding the definition of a 
“clearly established” right, and acknowledging the real-world effects of 
indemnification, the Court can begin to repair some of the substantial 
 
 154  In fact, more likely than not, an officer will only ever come in contact with some 
as opposed to all residents of the town, city, or county. 
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flaws in its qualified immunity jurisprudence.  As it does, more 
constitutional tort suits will be permitted to succeed—just as the Court 
in Monroe v. Pape intended all those years ago—thereby fostering law 
enforcement accountability.  Because criminal liability for police 
officers is, as a practical matter, nearly impossible in many situations, 
and because strategies like improving police training and recruiting 
tactics will likely take years to effectively implement on a national scale, 
civil liability is the immediate answer.  Civil suits are the fastest and 
most efficient way to ensure the imposition of at least some 
repercussions for uses of force that the nation (though not the legal 
system) have considered to be excessive, unnecessary, and, sometimes, 
outrageous.  Civil liability can be an initial, but potentially powerful, 
way to demonstrate that our officers are our guardians and that they 
are accountable to us—a principle that it seems many members of both 
the police and the policed have forgotten recently. 
Of course, large-scale police reform and everything it entails, 
including exploring ways to make criminal liability more feasible, are 
crucial and will serve a prominent role in effecting change in due time.  
But amending the application of qualified immunity to allow for 
increased civil liability for police violations of constitutional rights is 
the most immediate way to rebuild trust and begin healing the citizen-
police relationship. 
 
